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The Politics of the Punjab Boundary Award 
 
PERVAIZ IQBAL CHEEMA 
 
 
According to the partition plan of June 3,1947, the redrawing of the boundaries of 
the Punjab and Bengal was to be undertaken by the newly set up Boundary 
Commission after the provincial assemblies had taken a decision to this effect. 
Following assemblies decisions two commissions were established with Sir Cyril 
Radcliffe as the chairman of both commissions. The verdict of the commissions 
started an intense controversy. In many ways no man made boundary has caused so 
much troubles and effectively impeded the advent of peace in South Asia as has 
been done by the Punjab boundary resulting from the Commission's verdict. For 
both the Pakistanis and the Indians the boundary resulting from the partition of 
Punjab has proved to be a source of constant headaches and periodic convulsions. 
Just as the problematic border of the North Western Frontier Province (NWFP) 
elicited constant British vigilance, the Indo-Pak border in the Punjab area has kept 
the two nations continuously preoccupied throughout their independent existence. 
The hasty British departure along with unimaginative surgical partition of the 
Punjab left many complicated problems for the successor nations of British India. 
The inability of the British to partition the province in congruence with principles 
of justice and fair play produced unnecessarily a large pile of complex problems. 
What exactly happened during the partition processes revolving around the 
boundary question or the nature of policies that produced the existing borders is the 
endeavour of this article. Although, at the time of partition, Pakistan inherited 
insecure borders on both of its eastern and western wings, this article only 
concentrates on what was then known as the western wing and more specifically on 
the eastern border of its western wing. Pakistan inherited a long and exposed 
border with India. For the most part there are no natural barriers, like rivers and 
mountains to form the boundary as is the case with Afghanistan, Iran and China 
borders or was the case of the East Pakistan's border with Burma.1 Lack of natural 
features of India-Pakistan border, the controversial Radcliffe award and abnormal  
                                                 
1 For details of exact physical locations and the nature of topographical terrain see Ahmad 
1964:1-3. 
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start of India and Pakistan relations caused many border incidents generating and 
contributing a sizeable share of tension to the existing difficult and complicated 
relations between India and Pakistan. This article is an attempt to understand the 
basic principles governing the division of Punjab along with politics that caused the 
undesired departure from the adopted principles. In addition, efforts are directed to 
highlight the last minute changes loaded with far reaching consequences. What 
were the changes and who were responsible for such undesired alterations?  
 
B O U N D A R Y  F O R M A T I O N  P R O C E S S  
 
Border formation process is a very complex undertaking. Not only the concerned 
governments have to agree on some imaginary line but the actual delimitation and 
demarcation often confront the involved countries with acutely complex issues and 
problems. Borders and boundaries are the lines that separate an independent 
sovereign country from its neighbours and indicate the exact horizontal limits of a 
nation's territory and political authority (for details see Pounds 1963: 56-57; 
Prescott 1972: 54-55). The boundary reflects not only the geographic limits of a 
nation's sovereignty but also happens to be a meeting point of two neighbouring 
sovereignties. Gone are the days when no man's land separated the territories and 
confronted the neighbours with a dilemma of whose authority is to be exercised 
over this unclaimed and unsettled piece of land. Now nations do not hesitate even 
to go to war over an inch of their territories. The practice of maintaining a "no 
man's land" into which people could intrude at times and over which neither of the 
neighbouring countries enjoyed exclusive control backed by legal claim, is no 
longer operative. Perhaps that is why modern boundaries are drawn and marked 
with greater precision and clarity. The formation of an international boundary 
involves three main stages; (a) allocation stage which involves a boundary treaty 
allocating the territories to the involved countries; (b) delimitation stage which is 
concerned with the selection of specific geographical site, and (c) demarcation 
stage which requires that the agreed boundary be marked on the ground in some 
form such as construction of small pillars or installing fences or erecting walls or 
other forms of marking-posts differentiating limits of respective countries (Razvi 
1971: 4-7; Prescott 1972: 63; Pounds 1963: 65-66). It is possible that not all 
boundary formation processes would pass through all the above mentioned stages. 
In almost all cases, the most important stage is that of boundary agreement. This is 
especially important when a territory is divided between countries ignoring the 
cultural and ethnic realities of the area. Two types of situations often require 
agreements between nations in order to strengthen the legal sanctity of the 
boundary. The first situation is the one in which two nations advance their 
conflicting claims over a disputed territory which is resolved through an agreement 
between the involved parties. The other situation is the one in which a departing 
colonial power decides to divide certain territories in order to give due shares to 
their successors states. Once the agreement is signed, it is not essential that the 
boundary be specifically delimited and demarcated. If the natural barriers like 
mountain ranges and rivers or even the longitudes and latitudes form the border 
then states often consider that the delimitations and demarcations are unnecessary. 
Compared to a boundary treaty, delimitation of a boundary is a relatively complex 
process. A boundary agreement is often signed by people having limited firsthand 
knowledge of the actual physical terrain involved. The boundary treaty negotiators, 
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often decide with the help of specially prepared maps and reports about the people 
living in the boundary area. Perhaps that is why most boundary agreements are 
couched in generalised terms; the boundary shall run from point A to B, it shall 
keep so many miles from point X or from river Y; it shall follow river C or the 
crest of the chain of hills from D to E; it shall separate the two juxtaplaced cultural 
groups or tribes etc. (Pounds 1963: 65-66). To translate the boundary agreement 
into an exact description of the landscape itself is commonly known as the 
delimitation of the boundary (Pounds 1963: 65-66; Razvi 1971: 5; Curzon 1907: 
51). This task is often performed by a boundary commission consisting of 
representatives of both involves parties. In addition, the surveyors and small 
military force invariably assist the commission. Demarcation of boundary means 
actual laying down of a boundary line on the ground and defining it by some 
physical means such as boundary pillars, fences, walls etc.2 Once all the stages 
have been completed, then the cartographer draws the map of agreed boundary 
between countries on the basis of available data.3 
 Issues relating to borders are often extremely sensitive and invoke relatively 
stronger reactions. Since international borders have given birth to many disputes, it 
is considered essential that extreme care should be taken in defining the boundary 
line. A faulty definition could complicate the situation. Borders agreed upon during 
the colonial periods have often been a source of frictions between the decolonised 
independent states. Most colonial borders were defined in accordance with the then 
strategic or resource needs of the paramount powers. Not much weight was 
attached to the aspirations of the people involved in the border areas. Perhaps that 
is why one finds that the boundaries of the British Indian territories ran through the 
cultural and ethnic groups of same stock; such as Pakhtoons cut off from 
Pakhtoons, and Baluchs cut off from the Baluchs, Bengalis cut off from Bengalis, 
Assamese cut off from the Assamese etc.  
 Pakistan inherited all the undemarcated borders of the British India. The 
partition of the subcontinent provided a large man-made border with India which 
turned out to be even more problematic than British India's Afghan border. In 
addition, Pakistan also inherited a frontier on its North Western part. A "frontier" is 
a border zone which not only separates two independent countries but over which 
neither side enjoys full administrative and political control. While it is true to say 
that the frontier is a primitive concept of boundary, it is still held valid and applied 
in some part of the world (Pounds 1963: 57). There are two types of frontiers; 
political frontiers and settlement frontiers. While a settlement frontier divides the 
developed and undeveloped areas of a single country, the political frontier, like the 
boundary or border separates the two independent sovereign countries (Pounds 
1963: 56). Pakistan inherited both the political as well as the settlement frontiers in 
the North West. The settlement frontier could be divided into two categories, one 
                                                 
2 The terms delimitation and demarcation were introduced by Sir Henry McMahon who 
himself was directly involved in the delimitation of the boundary between India and Tibet 
(McMahon 1935: 2-16). 
3 It needs to be mentioned that maps are not regarded very reliable evidence of political 
boundaries by many international lawyers and geographers. A cartographer can make 
mistakes because of inadequate surveying or dictates of rulers could introduce involuntary 
distortions (Razvi 1971: 57). 
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that consists of settled areas and the other which is not fully settled. The second 
type is often referred to as the tribal belt which indicates a loose control of the state 
authority. The political frontier is primarily the boundary line that separates 
Pakistan from Afghanistan and divides the Pakhtoons from the Pakhtoons, and 
Baluchis from Baluchis on the Iranian border, Punjabis from the Punjabis on the 
Indo-Pak border.  
 
T H E  P U N J A B  B O U N D A R Y  C O M M I S S I O N  
 
Over the years Pakistan's border with India has proved to be the most trickiest. Not 
only is it a very long border with no natural barriers like rivers or mountains to 
separate the territories of these two independent neighbours but it has also caused 
innumerable border clashes making regular contributions toward the existing high 
level of mutual antagonism and hostilities especially during the immediate phase of 
post-partition period.4 Three reasons account for this. First, the division of the 
Indian subcontinent involved the partition of two large provinces of Punjab and 
Bengal; second, the Kashmir dispute; third, the general state of mutual suspicions 
and antagonism that followed the partition. The process of partitioning of Punjab 
and Bengal itself was a massive task studded with complex problems. Added to 
this was the inability of the British to arrange the accession of states to one 
Dominion or the other before the set dates of independence.5 The British could 
have set a deadline for the accession of all princely states before 14th August 1947 
but for some odd reasons they opted to avoid setting of such a date. To divide the 
provinces of Punjab and Bengal many proposals were advanced including the one 
that referred to the handing over the complex problem of boundary demarcation to 
the United Nations or to the International Court of Justice to which Pundit Nehru 
strongly objected on the grounds that it would involve cumbersome procedure and 
unacceptable delay.6 It needs to be highlighted here that while Nehru shot down the 
involvement of the UN in resolving the boundary question on the above mentioned 
grounds, he deemed it fit in his wisdom to seek the involvement of the UN in order 
to secure the resolution of the Kashmir dispute only few months later. Another 
proposal was attributed to Jinnah's thinking who was in favour of enlisting the 
services of Law Lords of the British House of Lords in order to form the boundary 
commission to which Mountbatten disagreed on the grounds that most Law Lords 
were elderly people who could not sustain the sweltering heat of the Indian 
                                                 
4 Pakistan's border with India was 3,486 miles long (East Pakistan's border was 2,162 miles 
and West Pakistan's border was 1,324 miles), out of which only 455 miles on The Eastern 
and 778 miles on The Western side were demarcated. Until March 1953 the undemarcated 
border of East Pakistan was 546 miles. See the Debates of the Constituent Assembly of 
Pakistan (Legislature) 1953: 323. 
5 Some writer even asserted that defects in British planning resulted in such failures (Lamb 
1968: 99). 
6 Alastair Lamb found Nehru's objection to UN involvement rather intriguing. He wrote 
that the 'United Nations might select people who were not very suitable, that is to say not in 
sympathy with Congress. More importantly the presence of the United Nations would 
surely introduce needless bureaucratic delays.' (Lamb 1995: 27). Also see Ali 1967: 203-
321; Campbell-Johnson 1953: 124; Choudhury 1968: 53-55. 
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Summer (Ali 1967: 203-321). Jinnah put this proposal because he was acutely 
conscious of the improbability of the Hindus and Muslim members of the 
Commissions reaching an unanimous verdict. Both the above mentioned 
suggestions were put in good faith and to facilitate the smooth working of the 
commission mainly because the task of redefining boundaries within a few weeks 
was generally regarded as massive undertaking especially if viewed within the 
context of existing communal tension. Finally the proposal that a boundary 
commission should be formed with an Englishman as its chairman with equal 
number of judges from both sides was accepted and eventually a boundary 
commission was formed which was headed by Sir Cyril Radcliffe with equal 
number of Hindus (Pro Congress) and Muslims (Pro Muslim-League) Judges. 
Jinnah seemed to have agreed to the appointment of Sir Cyril Radcliffe's 
chairmanship of the boundary commission primarily because of two operative 
factors: the constant pressure from Mountbatten who persuaded him to accept 
Radcliffe's name and the acute realisation of time constraints as there were only 
few weeks within which the transfer of power was to take place (Ali 1967: 203-
321). 
 According to the partition plan of June 3, 1947 the issue of redrawing the 
boundaries of Punjab and Bengal was to be resolved by a Boundary Commission 
which was to be set up following the provincial assemblies decision regarding the 
division of respective provinces. Meeting on 20 and 23 June the provincial 
assemblies of both Bengal and Punjab, sitting in separate sections representing 
Muslim and Hindu majority areas, voted on whether or not their provinces should 
be divided, and in both cases the sections representing Hindu majority areas opted 
for partition while the Muslim majority sections voted against the partition 
(Keesings Contemporary Archives June 21-28, 1947: 8679). Since both League 
and Congress had accepted the partition plan of 3rd June, which provided that if a 
simple majority of either section decided on partition, the divisions would take 
place, so it was decided to divide both the provinces. Consequently two Boundary 
Commissions were set up each consisting of four judges of Provincial High Courts 
and the names of members of the Commission were announced on 30 June with Sir 
Cyril Radcliffe as the Chairman of both the Commissions (Keesings Contemporary 
Archives June 28-July 5, 1946: 8696). The Punjab Boundary Commission included 
Justice Din Mohammad and Justice Mohammad Munir on behalf of the Muslim 
League, and Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan and Justice Tej Sindh on behalf of the 
Congress. The Bengal Boundary Commission consisted of Justice Abu Saleh 
Mohammad Akram and Justice S.A. Rahman representing the Muslim League and 
Justice C.C. Biswas and Justice B. K. Mukerji representing Congress (Ali 1967: 
204). The Commissions were charged with the task of dividing both Punjab and 
Bengal on the basis of ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of Muslims and 
non-Muslims and in so doing it could also take into account 'other factors' (Ali, 
1967: 204-205; Lakhanpal 1958: 34). 
 Since the pro-Indian and pro-Pakistani judges were ultimately unable to evolve 
the desired consensus, it was left to Sir Cyril Radcliffe to take the final decision 
(Blinkenberg 1972: 53). The award was announced on 17th August which invoked 
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strong and angry reactions from both the Pakistanis as well as the Indians. Despite 
the fact that Jinnah had known before the actual announcement of the award that 
the line decided by Radcliffe was going to seriously damage the Muslim interests, 
he stuck to his prior commitment that he would accept the award and consequently 
he accepted the award, unlike his Indian counterparts, rather gracefully.7 
 
T H E  A W A R D  
 
Constituted towards the end of June with the instructions to demarcate the 
boundaries of the two parts of Bengal/Punjab 'on the basis of ascertaining the 
contiguous areas of the Muslims and the non-Muslims', both Commissions started 
their work in July 1947 (Symonds 1949: 85; Ali 1967: 204-5). Having given his 
directions to the members of the commission, Radcliffe decided not to sit with the 
commission as he thought that his assigned role of being an umpire would only 
become operational if the commission failed to make a unanimous or a majority 
decision (Khan 1983: 137-41). However he asked for a daily report of the 
proceedings. Many public meetings were held in which arguments were presented 
by various counsels on behalf of the Muslim League, Congress, Sikhs and other 
concerned parties. The League's case particularly with regard to the Punjab was 
presented by Sir Zafrullah Khan who prepared the case rather hurriedly because of 
the time constraints (Khan 1983: 137-41). According to Zafrullah Khan, no clear 
instructions were given to him either by Jinnah or the then known leaders of Punjab 
Muslim League on what lines the case was to be presented to the Commission. The 
only exception Zafrullah Khan mentioned was Mian Mumtaz Mohammad Khan 
Daultana who discussed the case within him and agreed with the line already 
worked out a day before.8 Zafrullah also mentioned that Justice Din Mohammad 
told him that Radcliffe had already decided in his mind the line of demarcation of 
the boundary which was seriously prejudicial to Muslim interests (Khan 1983: 137-
41). As expected, the Commission could not reach a unanimous verdict and the fate 
of millions was left to the whim of one man, the Chairman Sir Cyril Radcliffe who 
had never visited India before and did not even sit in the public hearings (Brines 
1968: 43; Ali 1967: 205; Choudhury 1968: 53).  
 The final award was announced on 17 August 1947 and published next day 
though the deliberations were completed by 8 August. In almost all cases Radcliffe, 
in finalising the award, strictly adhered to the 'religious affinity factor' except in the 
case of Gurdaspur District of Punjab (Choudhury 1968: 53). It is interesting to note 
                                                 
7 Justice Din Muhammad went to see Jinnah in order to secure his consent to resign from 
the Boundary Commission. He informed Jinnah that Radcliffe had already settled in his 
mind the line of demarcation of the boundary which was seriously prejudicial to Muslim 
interests. But Jinnah refused to give the desired permission (Khan 1983: 140). Jinnah 
referred to the award as unjust, incomprehensible and even perverse but asserted that as 
honourable people it hadto be accepted because of prior commitment to the Boundary 
Commission (Jinnah 1963: 12; Chaudhury 1968: 57). 
8 The line Zafrullah had worked out in consultation with four young lawyers was based on 
subdistrict level population figures which was more helpful than district level figures from 
the Muslim's point of view (Khan 1983: 137-41). 
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that in the case of Calcutta, the argument of linkage dependency did not seem 
acceptable to Radcliffe. Although in the City of Calcutta the Muslims were no 
more than one-fourth of the total population of the city, 'the hinterland, on which 
the life of Calcutta as a city and port depended and of which it formed an integral 
part, was a Muslim majority area' (Ali 1967: 207). Besides, a large segment of 
Calcutta's population consisted of scheduled castes who had allied themselves with 
the Muslim League (Ali 1967: 207). Radcliffe decided not only to award Calcutta 
to India but also gave the Muslim majority district of Murshidabad and a greater 
part of the Muslim majority district of Nadia to India (Ali 1967: 208-9). Had there 
been a free plebiscite held to ascertain the wishes of the people of Calcutta, the 
chances were that it would have opted for Pakistan (Ali 1967: 208-9). While 
Mountbatten decided to hold a referendum in NWFP, a Muslim majority province 
encircled by other provinces that had already been included in Pakistan, he was 
extremely unhappy and reluctant over the suggestion to subject Calcutta to a 
referendum (Ali 1967: 208-9; Campbell-Johnson 1953:71-2). Three facts explain 
Mountbatten's refusal to hold a referendum in Calcutta similar to the one he 
ordered for NWFP. First, Lord Ismay took Mountbatten's original plan of partition 
to London at a time (on 2 July 1947) when the Boundary Commissions were just 
getting ready to start their work, in order to seek final approval of the British 
Government. According to that plan, wrote Ismay, Western Bengal including 
Calcutta was to go to India (Ismay 1960: 42; also see Ali 1967: 208). How could 
Mountbatten decide which part of Bengal was to go to India or Pakistan much 
before the final award of the Boundary Commissions was announced unless he had 
already decided what was to be allocated to India and Pakistan irrespective of the 
final awards of the Commission?  
 The second important fact in this regard is how could the then editor of The 
Statesman, while commenting on the Radcliffe award, categorically states that it 
was known before the finalisation of the award that Calcutta was to go to India 
(Stephens 1963: 180)? Who leaked this news? Members of the Commission were 
sworn to secrecy and it dose not seem convincing that Radcliffe himself would 
indulge in such a practice. Three years later the mystery of the leak was resolved 
when V.B. Patel, speaking in Calcutta in January 1950, revealed that the Congress 
agreed to partition provided Calcutta would be allocated to India (The Hindu, Jan. 
16 1950). This was the third fact which clearly reflects that Mountbatten had not 
only already decided the future fate of Calcutta but had also kept the Muslim 
League in the dark regarding his plan to hand over Calcutta to India. This also 
indicates that Mountbatten knew the Congress preferences and catered for them 
with his own carefully contrived tactical moves. The information that was handed 
over to the Muslim League was that the fate of Calcutta would be decided by the 
Boundary Commission. Indeed this appears to be a good tactical move.  
 The award in Punjab generated a wave of indignation in Pakistan. It was 
regarded as extremely unfair, disgusting, abominable and one-sided (Times, 18-19 
August 1947; The Pakistan Times, 19 August, 1947). Although the major focus of 
Pakistan's resentment was the allocation of the Muslim majority district Gurdaspur 
to India, the Punjab Boundary Commission had also awarded to India parts of 
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several districts of Punjab in which the population was predominantly Muslim 
(Wilber 1964: 216). Loss of Gurdaspur District was viewed as a major blow 
because it meant something much more than simple award of additional territory to 
India (Choudhury 1968: 53-4). This was a decision which not only linked Kashmir 
to India but also facilitated India's forcible occupation of the State at a later stage 
(Rushbrook-Williams 1962: 48). The district of Gurdaspur consisted of four tehsils 
(sub divisions), Gurdaspur, Batala, Shakergarh and Pathankot. Apart from 
Pathankot which had a Hindu majority, all the others were Muslim majority tehsils. 
If the principle of religious affinity had been applied then the whole district should 
have been awarded to Pakistan. Radcliffe decided to allot three-fourth of the 
district to India giving an access to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. In addition, 
Radcliffe also gave the Muslim majority tehsils of Ajnala (Amritsar District), Zira, 
Ferozpur (in Ferozpur District), Nakodar and Jullander (in Jullander District) to 
India. Radcliffe's explanation of those allocations was rather hollow and flimsy. He 
argued that in those cases he decided to avoid disruption of railway 
communications and the water system (The Times, August 19 1947; Ali 1967: 213-
14). The Indus waters dispute lasting over 13 years clearly indicates that partition 
had disrupted the water system and as far as the railways were concerned, it was 
obvious that they would be effected with the partition of British India and 
consequent emergence of two independent Dominions.  
 
T H E  P O L I T I C S  
 
The award of three-fourth of Gurdaspur District genuinely hurt the Pakistanis. 
"Loss of Gurdaspur district was not merely a territorial murder of Pakistan, it 
meant much more. [...] Without Gurdaspur India had no claim whatsoever to 
Kashmir."(Choudhury 1968: 54-55) It was the Radcliffe award which provided the 
essential rail link to the Indian forces with the State of Jammu and Kashmir. It 
would have been extremely difficult for India to fight a Kashmir war without this 
necessary rail connection with the State (Birdwood 1953: 235-6; and idem 1956: 
74). Why did Radcliffe go for such an unfair award? Was he influenced or induced 
by Mountbatten? To answer these questions, a number of aspects of this tragic 
episode should be mentioned. By most accounts it seems safe to assume that 
Mountbatten was the man responsible for causing the undesirable changes in the 
above mentioned award. If he himself did not alter it, he seemed to have influenced 
the concerned quarters to bring in line the actual position of the provinces with his 
thinking. Sufficient evidence exists to support this contention. To begin with, it 
was commonly believed that Mountbatten wanted to be the Governor-General of 
both the Dominions for at least eight or nine months from 15 August 1947 onward 
– the man who not only awarded their independence but also guided them in their 
infancy; Jinnah's decision to become the first Governor-General of Pakistan 
wounded Mountbatten's pride (Ali 1967: 173-8; Choudhury 1968: 56; Stephens 
1963: 176). Attempts were made even after Jinnah's decision to devise a formula 
by which Mountbatten could continue as the Governor-General of both Dominions 
(Ali 1967: 177; Mosley 1961: 248). Once it became clear that Jinnah would not 
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change his decision, many observers noticed a distinct change in Mountbatten's 
attitude towards Pakistan (Ali 1967: 177).  
 Another aspect of the Punjab award which puzzles many is the discovery of a 
pencil sketch of the award among the papers that Evan Jenkins, the last Governor 
of undivided Punjab, left behind. The sketch map was prepared by the Viceroy's 
private Secretary George Abell on 8 August 1947 in response to a request from 
Jenkins who was anxious to know the main outline of the boundary in order to 
make necessary administrative and security arrangements (Ali 1967: 217). The 
sketch map included the tehsils of Zira and Ferozpur on the Pakistani side but when 
the award was announced, these areas were included in India. Jenkins, anxious to 
avert the perceived communal bloodshed wanted advance information in order to 
make adequate security arrangements. He contacted Mountbatten's Private 
Secretary George Abell in order to seek the desired information. Abell supplied 
him the sketch map which was prepared on the August 8, 1947. Obviously, Abell 
could not have passed on this information without Mountbatten's authorisation and 
the requisite information could only be procured from Radcliffe's office or from his 
staff. The sketch map supplied to Jenkins clearly indicated that both tehsils of Zira 
and Ferozpur were to be assigned to Pakistan. It can be safely assumed that 
Radcliffe intended to include those tehsils on the Pakistani side, but somehow or 
other during the period between 8 August and 17 August 1947 for some mysterious 
reasons he changed his mind and gave those tehsils to India.  
 Two points need to highlighted here. First, assuming that the sketch map was 
based on authentic information supplied by the Radcliffe's office, then the map 
prepared on 8th August had shown the tehsils Zira and Ferozpur on Pakistan's side 
but the final Radcliffe report included these tehsils on the Indian side. Some writers 
have questioned the accuracy of the map and argued that this map was not intended 
to reflect the exact location of the boundary and was supplied for administrative 
purposes. Indeed it makes sense but even for administrative purposes, one tends to 
mark the broad administrative unit such as district or tehsil and this map clearly 
reflected that tehsils of Zira and Ferozpur were on the side of Pakistan. To further 
strengthen this point, there exist corroborative evidence reflecting Radcliffe's 
intentions to include these tehsils on Pakistani side. Justice Din Mohammad, a 
member of the Punjab Boundary Commission, informed the Government of 
Pakistan that when Muslim members of the Commission started their arguments 
for the above mentioned tehsils, Radcliffe stopped them with a remark 'that it was 
unnecessary to argue so obvious a case' (Ali 1967: 217-18). Radcliffe at the time 
appeared totally convinced that these Muslim majority areas east of the Sutlej river 
and in the angle of the Beas and Sutlej would automatically go to Pakistan. Later, 
he gave these two tehsils to India without any logical or even valid explanations. 
Why did Radcliffe change his mind about what he himself regarded as an obvious 
case for inclusion into Pakistan? According to Sir Zafrullah Khan, Justice Din 
Mohammad saw him before leaving for Delhi to seek Jinnah's permission to resign 
from the Boundary Commission and informed him that Radcliffe had already 
settled in his mind the line of the boundary which was seriously prejudicial to 
Muslim interests (Khan 1983: 140). Jinnah refused to grant him the permission to 
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resign. Chaudhry Muhammad Ali had gone to Delhi in connection with the 
question of national debt on 9th August 1947 and before he left Karachi he was 
told by Liaquat Ali Khan that Jinnah had received very disturbing news that the 
Muslim majority areas were in danger of being allocated to India and was asked to 
communicate Jinnah's concerns to Lord Ismay (Ali 1967: 218-19). He went straight 
to Viceroy's house and conveyed to Lord Ismay Jinnah's apprehensions who not 
only expressed complete ignorance about Radcliffe's ideas regarding the boundary 
but also stressed categorically that neither Mountbatten nor he himself had ever 
discussed the question with him (ibid.). According to Mohammad Ali he not only 
saw a map hanging in Lord Ismay's office with a pencil line drawn across the map 
of Punjab reflecting the possible boundary and clearly indicating that tehsils of Zira 
and Ferozpur were included on Pakistani side, but he also drew Lord Ismay's 
attention to the map on the wall. The second point that needs some attention is the 
question of mysterious delay between the finalisation of the accord and its eventual 
announcement. According to Munir the award was finalised on 8th August but it 
was kept secret even from the leaders and members of the Partition Council till its 
announcement. Why was the award not announced before the partition day? One 
explanation of delayed announcement is that the British wanted 'to divert odium 
from the British and to avoid turning a day of rejoicing over Indian and Pakistani 
freedom into one of mourning over disappointed territorial hopes' (Hodson 1969: 
351). It was indeed a flimsy excuse and totally unconvincing explanation as far as 
the latter half is concerned. However the first half of the explanation that the 
British wanted to divert odium has some merit. Indeed British had always looked 
after their own interests and the concerns for the welfare of the natives was never a 
serious impediment in British calculations. However in this case it was 
Mountbatten who had asked Radcliffe to delay the publication of the award 
whereas Radcliffe firmly opposed the delay in publishing the award. Yet one finds 
that in the ultimate analysis it was Mountbatten who carried the day. Justice 
Mohammad Munir was of the opinion that then desired alterations took place 
between 8 August and 17 August, when Radcliffe was the guest of Mountbatten in 
Delhi, and Mountbatten must have induced Radcliffe to make those changes (The 
Pakistan Times, 22-24 June 1964; Choudhury 1968: 55-56). Justice Munir did not 
believe that Radcliffe would have changed the award on his own accord as he knew 
that the original award had already been sent to Sir Evan Jenkins and no new 
arguments based on convincing evidence had been sent to him but Munir did not 
rule out the possibility of alteration being introduced under the concerted pressures 
of Mountbatten. Justice Munir thought that the award was more political than 
judicial, as 'it lacked every attribute of a judicial decision' (The Pakistan Times, 22-
24 June 1964). 'If the award was judicial, lacked every attribute of a judicial 
decision, and if it was political', stressed Munir, 'why lay claim to justice, fairness 
and impartiality'? 'Why not say that India belonged to the British and their Viceroy 
gave it to whomever he liked?' (The Pakistan Times, June 22-24 1964; Choudhury 
1968: 55-56)  
 The Radcliffe award was regarded by the Pakistanis as extremely unjust and a 
decision violating all the accepted principles of fairness and justice. Sardar Abdur 
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Rab Nishter described it as 'the parting kick of the British to Pakistan' (The Times, 
August 18, 1947; The Pakistan Times, August 19 1947). Despite the fact that even 
Jinnah was greatly upset by the abominable award and interpreted it as 
incomprehensible and even perverse, he decided to live up to the commitment and 
to abide by the decision and asserted that we must bear this blow 'with fortitude, 
courage and hope' (Jinnah 1963: 32-3).  
 
O T H E R  F A C T O R S  
 
Perhaps the most complicated aspect of the politics revolving around the boundary 
awarded was the interpretation of 'other factors'. Exactly what were these other 
factors which invoked so many ambiguous interpretations? Why were these 'other 
factors' never clearly spelt out or were they meant to be ambiguous in order to 
facilitate the manipulation of partition processes of the then known somewhat 
volatile border? Perhaps one way to study and analyse these 'other factors' is to 
place them in six categories; security, water, communalism, communication, Sikhs 
and Mountbatten's attitude. It is a well known fact that the incumbent atmosphere 
on the eve of partition was heavily charged and to undertake such a complex task 
of dividing Punjab and Bengal was indeed not an easy pursuit. To make things 
little more complicated, the British Government appointed Sir Cyril Radcliffe, a 
man who had no idea about the complexities of Indian politics. Not only India was 
to be partitioned within 10 weeks following the acceptance of June 3rd plan, but 
ongoing communalism coupled with leading political parties continuous 
confrontationists pursuits and politics (League vs. Congress) required the wisdom 
and guidance of a man who understood India and the Indians rather well. 
Admittedly Mountbatten's decision to give Britain only 73 days to get out of India 
after having been responsiblefor Indian affairs for almost 250 years was somewhat 
illogical and appeared hasty, but to appoint a man who had absolutely no 
knowledge of the intricacies surrounding the Indian politics coupled with the 
stresses and stains accompanying the ongoing freedom movement does not appear 
to be a well thought out decision. Radcliffe hardly knew where the provinces of 
Punjab and Bengal were physically located. But the argument advanced at the time 
was that the job required a man without Indian experiences. It was assumed that 
anyone with the knowledge of the country and its politics would have acted in 
prejudicial manner (Collins/ Lapierre 1975: 179-80). Indeed ignorance can be a 
bliss in some situations but it is equally true that such admirable ignorance can also 
cause irreparable damage. This is precisely what happened in the cases of Indian 
boundary awards particularly in Punjab. 
 
a )  S E C U R I T Y  
 
Among the 'other factors', security issues seem to have not been paid proper 
attention to by almost all concerned. Three factors seem to have strengthened the 
notion that security issues were not only totally disregarded but they were not 
viewed within the ambit of 'other factors'. Had the security implications of the 
 
PERVAIZ IQBAL CHEEMA 12 
announced awards been properly comprehended, the nature of the award would 
have been different and far more judicial and realistic in nature. It seems that 
Mountbatten deliberately adopted a soft approach towards security issues as he 
believed that speed of transfer would avoid the troubles (Roberts 1994: 89). While 
it is not too difficult to see the application of military principles which sometimes 
do pay the desired dividends in battlefields, the then prevalent political situation 
required a totally different type of approach. Yet Mountbatten, in his wisdom, 
continued to treat the Indian political scene as another Asian battle front. What 
appears somewhat intriguing is that controlling communal riots with military 
precision did not attract Mountbatten's attention. Being a military man, it was 
expected that Mountbatten would be able to effectively utilise the military means in 
order to combat the rising intensity of communalism. A half hearted attempt to 
maintain peace in the explosive border areas seem to have been made when a 
Boundary Force was established on 1st August 1947 (Burke 1975: 62). Despite the 
fact that communal rioting had intensified, the Partition Council only decided on 
July 22 to set up special militarycommand to protect the migrating population of 
many districts of Punjab with Major General Rees as its commanding officer.9 
 While the commander was an Englishman, almost the entire Boundary Force 
consisted of mixed units of Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs and Christian soldiers. To 
expect that such a force would not be influenced by the then prevalent loaded 
atmosphere was ludicrous. Indeed there were indications that the ongoing 
communalism would eventually engulf the Boundary Force as well but it appears 
that not much attention was paid to the mixed composition of the units and it was 
hoped that communal virus will not infect the force (Khan 1967: 16). 'Not 
surprisingly, the commander of the Boundary Force reported on 25th August that 
the atmosphere within his force had become very explosive and a small incident 
might provoke fighting' (Burke 1975: 62). It appears that the responsibility for the 
safety of millions of unfortunates who were compelled to move and trek their way 
to the other side of the borders did not rate high enough on the priority ladder of 
Mountbatten. Instead of deploying mixed units of Indian soldiers, he could have 
opted for a force entirely consisting of British troops only. A British force would 
have been certainly far more effective and would have acted more impartially 
under the then existing circumstances that were so heavily charged with the virus 
of communalism. The excuse that the Congress leaders would not have consented 
to the employment of British troops fails to carry conviction for no such proposal 
was made to them (Ali 1967: 196).  
 The second factor generating the impression that scant regard was paid to 
security aspects was the undesired delay in the announcement of the award. Many 
accounts clearly point towards the fact that the award was finalised before the date 
of the partition but was not announced till 17th August. (Burke 1975: 62). It really 
does not make sense that why the award was finalised too close to the 
independence day and to make things worse why the announcement was delayed 
                                                 
9 The Boundary Force was supposed to protect the population of Sialkot, Gujranwala, 
Sheikhupura, Lyallpur, Montgomery, Lahore, Amritsar, Gurdaspur, Hoshiarpour, 
Jullundur, Ferozpur and Ludhiana (Khan 1967: 15-17). 
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for another four days. One had to judge the security implications of this undesired 
delay especially within the context of intensified communal riots coupled with well 
planned Sikh attacks on the migrating Muslims without proper arrangements for 
transportation. With ineffective civil administration and insufficient Boundary 
Force, the delay in announcement implied that millions were kept uncertain. 
Consequently when the announcement came, millions found themselves on the 
wrong side of the border resulting into unparalleled carnage.  
 The third factor reflecting scant regard for security implications is somewhat 
futuristic orientated. At no stage sufficient considerations seem to have been 
extended to the fact that if the entire district of Gurdaspur was not given to 
Pakistan on the basis of existing Muslim majority coupled with deliberate 
provision of access to Kashmir could encourage India to make concerted efforts to 
secure Kashmir's accession in one form or the other. Four existing factors should 
have attracted the attention of Mr. Radcliffe. One that Nehru had never made any 
secret of his passion for Kashmir. Second, Nehru's close ties with the popular 
Kashmiri leader Sheikh Abdullah was too well known to be ignored. Third, the 
Maharajah was a Hindu Dogra. With the ongoing intensity of communal rioting 
and pressures exerted by the Hindu political leaders as well as by the non-Muslim 
rulers of other Indian states should have injected some doses of realism. Finally 
Mountbatten's visible tilt towards Congress and his concerted efforts to secure the 
accession of many princely states to India was too obvious to escape the attention 
of members of the Boundary Commission especially that of Radcliffe. Compared 
to Mountbatten's role in securing the accession of Jaipur, Jaisalmere, and 
Hyderabad where he forcefully argued with the rulers to join India, he did not play 
a similar role in the case of Kashmir (Cheema 1990: 39). At no stage did he make 
any attempt to impress upon the Maharajah that in view of the geographical and 
strategic factors coupled with the fact of the overwhelming Muslim population that 
the State should accede to Pakistan (Ibid.; Ali 1967: 286). Perhaps that is why he 
did not even bother to highlight the significance of access to India by the award of 
three tehsils of Gurdaspur. He knew it well that Kashmir was heavily dependent 
upon Pakistan for all the essential supplies which were coming through the 
traditional routes that were directly linked with Pakistan. The alternative route via 
Pathankot was never really used for transportation of goods as this was not well 
developed. But the existence of a route that could link Kashmir with India enabled 
the Congress to seriously work towards its acquisition. It does not sound very 
concincing that a trained military mind would not have properly comprehended the 
significance of such a route. To provide India this particular route was part of a 
well contrived plan of action in which Mountbatten seemed to have played an 
extremely significant role. It needs to be mentioned here that Radcliffe, of course, 
denied that access to Kashmir via Pathankot was one of the 'other factors' affecting 
the award (Hodson 1969: 354). Again it is difficult to believe that he did not realise 
the significance and importance of access which would be provided by allocating 
Pathankot to India especially when he himself made sure that a link to Pathankot 
was ensured through the Muslim majority tehsils of Gurdaspur and Batala which he 
awarded to India. He could have simply allocated Pathankot to India and rest of the 
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district to Pakistan in congruence with the basic principle governing the partition of 
the province.  
 
b )  W A T E R  D I S T R I B U T I O N  
 
Perhaps an even more important factor that was directly linked with what came to 
be known as 'other factors' could be classified as the water distribution factor. Prior 
to partition, the province of Punjab had a well developed irrigation network. The 
canals leading out of the Punjab's five main rivers catered for water supplied to 
almost all cultivable areas of Punjab. While the Punjab canal irrigation network 
was frequently hailed as one of the greatest achievements of the British Raj, it was 
not accorded deserving and balanced attention. A close scrutiny of water-flow 
disruption of the Punjab canal system clearly reflect that very little considerations 
were extended to the interests of Pakistan whereas no efforts were spared to 
facilitate both the Indian as well as Mountbatten's interests. However, it needs to be 
stressed here that some writers are of the opinion that the complicated water canal 
system in Punjab was a major source of justification for the award (Blinkenberg 
1972: 74-75). Indeed it provided one sided justification and it was only India which 
benefited from this factor. Thus Radcliffe and Mountbatten appeared to have 
managed to equip India with this lethal weapon. In case of those territories which 
were eventually included in Pakistan, this consideration played a totally 
insignificant role. On the contrary, this factor damaged their interests. Not only the 
subsequent water distribution problem can be regarded as legitimate child of 
Radcliffe's insufficient devotion to the likely implications of water disruption, but 
he seems to have totally ignored the problems of a lower riparian that could face 
enormous hardships if the vital controlling headworks were placed in hands of 
opponents. Indeed what was totally ignored was the fact that the partition of Punjab 
would cut across the rivers and canals of its irrigation system and if adequate 
considerations were not extended to the rights of lower riparian, the lower riparian 
could experience severe sufferings. Not only Radcliffe decided to give Muslim 
majority areas to India disregarding the basic principle employed for the division of 
Punjab, he also gave to India two very important headworks which fed canals in 
West Punjab. Both the Madhopur headworks on river Ravi and Ferozpur 
headworks on the Sutlej river controlling the Upper Bari Doab and Dipalpur canals 
in West Punjab and Easter Grey canal whichirrigated also parts of Bahawalpur 
were given to India (Ali 1967: 318-19; Cheema 1990: 33-34). Admittedly Radcliffe 
was assured by his Indian as well as Pakistani colleagues that the existing 
arrangements for sharing of water would be respected, but how could he be so 
naive not to realise that in the absence of a long term legal treaty framework the 
two successor nations would respect the existing arrangements. Following the 
dissolution of Aribitral Tribunal (which was set up to deal with the disputed cases) 
on 1st April 1948, India immediately stopped, without any prior warning, the flow 
of waters in Central Bari Doab and Dipalpur canals causing extreme hardships for 
thousands of Pakistani cultivators. The dangerous implications of this move were 
aptly described by an eminent expert who wrote that no army, with bombs and 
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shellfire could devastate a land so thoroughly as Pakistan could be devastated by 
simple expedient of India's permanently shutting off the sources of water that keep 
the fields and people of Pakistan alive.10 However if the entire district of Gurdaspur 
along with the Muslim majority tehsil of Ajnala had been allocated to Pakistan, 
there would have been no disruption of the upper Bari Doab canal. Radcliffe 
himself admitted in his report that he was unable to preserve the undivided 
irrigation system of the upper Bari Doab despite the fact that he made several 
adjustments to mitigate consequences of disruption (Ali 1967: 214-15). This 
particular canal originated from Madhopur headworks in Pathankot and extended 
to Lahore district. The simple solution to this problem was to allot the entire 
district of Gurdaspur to Pakistan as the district was known to be a Muslim majority 
contiguous area.  
 Compared to Pakistani Muslim cultivators interests the interests of the Indians 
were given utmost considerations. Last minute alterations which gave Ferozpur and 
Zira to India throw ample light on Radcliffe's soft attitude towards Mountbatten 
and his coconspirators Indian leaders. Recently revealed source material seem to 
indicate that Mountbatten, under pressure from Nehru and the Maharaja of Bikaner 
persuaded Radcliffe to alter the Award and give both Ferozpur and Zira to India 
(Roberts 1994: 93-94). The canal headworks which controlled the irrigation of 
Bikaner was located at Ferozpur and the Maharaja of Bikaner who had discovered 
somehow or the other that Ferozpur was being allocated to Pakistan began to 
pressurize both Nehru and Mountbatten as he did not want that the flow of water to 
his state be controlled by Pakistan. He believed that Bikaner's irrigation network 
would be adversely affected if Ferozpur headworks was allotted to Pakistan. In 
order to secure his interest he even threatened that if Ferozpur and Zira went to 
Pakistan, Bikaner would accede to Pakistan (Ibid. 100-101). Two questions need to 
be raised here. First how did Nehru, the Maharaja of Bikaner and Mountbatten 
know what was in Radcliffe's secret award? Second, Ferozpur housed an important 
weapon's dump, did this arsenal generate any compelling considerations? 
According to Christopher Beaumont who was appointed as the Secretary to the 
Boundary Commission on July 7, 1947, the appointment of an Hindu Civil Servant 
V.D. Ayer as the Assistant Secretary on 8th July was a mistake and Beaumont 
guardedly points finger at Ayer as the likely source who was constantly in touch 
with Nehru and V.P. Menon communicating the progress in boundary formation 
processes. While Beaumont even acknowledged that evidence against Ayer was 
somewhat circumstantial but the leak regarding the fate of Chittagong Hill Tracts 
and Nehru's quick and biting reaction even before Beaumont actually presented the 
Commission's Report to the Viceroy convinced Beaumont that the only way Nehru 
could have known about it was via Ayer (Ibid.: 95). The second question revolving 
around the weapon's dump also deserve some explanation. The loss of Ferozpur 
arsenal was indeed a crippling blow to Pakistan if viewed within context of 
subsequent farce of division of military assets. Since all the three actors involved in 
                                                 
10 David E. Lilienthal former Chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority studied the 
implications of water disruption and wrote an article in which he explained in detail the 
impact of such disruption (Lilienthal 1951).  
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this drama wanted to deprive Pakistan of almost every type of assets Abell's 
telegram informing Punjab Governor Jenkins to 'eliminate salient' must have been 
based on dual considerations of catering to Bikaner's interests as well as to deprive 
Pakistan of a valuable arsenal. Sir Francis Mudie the former Governor of Sindh and 
Punjab, emphatically stressed in his unpublished memories that he found it difficult 
to believe that the sudden change of Ferozpur and Zira's status without explanation 
was not the result of pressures put on Radcliffe by Mountbatten and his 
government (Quoted in ibid.: 94).  
 
c )  C O M M U N A L I S M U S  
 
The third factor which could have and should have attracted considerable attention 
of the Commission was communalism. At the time of partition the intensity of 
communal riots had acquired alarmingly dangerous proportions. It does not seem 
very convincing that the Commission-members had shut their eyes to killings that 
were so regularly taking place in almost all parts of Punjab. Strict adherence to the 
basic principle governing the partition of Punjab that the contiguous Muslim 
majority area would go to Pakistan and contiguous Hindu majority areas would 
remain with India, would have certainty caused less misery and agony of the 
people involved. A simple glance at the map enables even a stranger to quickly 
decide that the three tehsils of Gurdaspur district (Gurdaspur, Batala and 
Shakirgarh) along with tehsils of Ferozpur, Zira and Ajnala should have gone to 
Pakistan. All were, in some form, adjacent to the territories that eventually formed 
Pakistan. Three developments seemed to have exacerbated the communal situation. 
Perhaps the most important aspect was Mountbatten's somewhat sceptical and 
indifferent attitude towards the deteriorating communal situation. He did not 
appear to be convinced that the riots were taking that heavy toll of human life. 
According to Sir Francis Tuker, the rulers of some states of Punjab (Patiala, 
Kapurthala and others) played a despicable role in intensifying the killings.11 These 
rulers not only allowed the marauding Sikh bands to use their territories as 
sanctuaries but also beefed up their strength by encouraging their own state troops 
to join in the killing sprees. While the Sikh started a systematic genocide of the 
Muslims in various parts of Punjab, Mountbatten did not make any counter efforts 
to frustrate Sikh's plan despite of the fact that he was well informed about their 
plans and was already warned by Sir Evan Jenkins. Second important fact that 
needs to be mentioned here is Radcliffe's scant respect for these considerations. 
Had he been considerate enough of these horrible developments, one can safely 
assume that he would have gone for strict application of adjacent majority area 
principle. Third, the secret deal between Mountbatten and the Congress for 
advancing the date for the transfer of power from June 1, 1948 to August 14, 1947 
deprived the departing British of sufficient time to make the necessary 
arrangements for smooth transfer or at least to minimise the intensity of massacre 
on one hand and denied Pakistan some time deemed so essential to organise 
                                                 
11 For gory details see Tuker 1950: 445-49; also quoted in Ali 1967: 254-75. 
 
PERVAIZ IQBAL CHEEMA 17 
effective administration on a sound basis.12 
 
d )  C O M M U N I C A T I O N  
 
The operative communication system was perhaps the fourth major consideration 
linked with the 'other factors', more specifically existing railway network. Both the 
Punjab irrigation system and railway network were regarded as great gifts of the 
British to their Indian empire. When a country is divided both the roads and 
railway tracts often experience disruption of continuity. If the successor nations 
evolve friendly relationships, not much impact of division is registered but if the 
successor nations are locked up in an antagonistic set of relationships, then many 
roads and railway tracts are often transformed into a cul de sac. Too much attention 
to the preservation of railway's continuity is indeed uncalled for. However it is 
alleged that when three tehsils of Gurdaspur were allocated to India, considerations 
for rail link also contributed their share. It appears that when it was decided to 
provide India access to the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the existence of a rail link 
to Pathankot must have proved another useful element. Compared to such one 
sided approaches based on somewhat flimsy arguments, the Commission did not 
give similar kind of sympathetic considerations to East Pakistan's claim to 
Calcutta. Assessing by any logical yardstick one cannot escape the conclusion that 
Calcutta should have been allocated to East Pakistan. From purely communication 
considerations, the physical separation of the East Pakistan from West Pakistan by 
itself makes a very strong case for the award of Calcutta to Pakistan. Compared to 
the Punjab  award, such considerations did not figure prominently as far as the 
Bengal award was concerned. Instead the Englishman involved opted to hand over 
Calcutta to India disregarding the principles of justice and fairplay. 
 
e )  S I K H S  
 
The question of Sikh's aspirations was also deemed to be directly linked with the 
'other factors'. The Sikhs along with their partner Congress were pressing hard for 
shifting of the boundary as far west as the river Chenab and were insisting on the 
inclusion in East Punjab of Muslim majority districts of Lahore, Sheikhupura, 
Montgomery, Lyallpur, Gujranwala, Sialkot and Gurdaspur on the grounds of the 
existence of Sikh Shrines in those areas (Ali 1967: 210). On the same grounds, 
Pakistan could have laid claim to Sirhind, Delhi and Ajmer which had Muslim 
Shrines of great sanctity. As far as areas like Montgomery and Lyallpur were 
concerned, the Sikh's based their claim on the basis of contributions they made in 
developing these areas. Compared to Sikh contributions in these areas, the 
contributions made by the Muslim peasantry were much more and in terms of 
                                                 
12 Ibid. Sir George Cunningham, a former Governor of NWFP and Private Secretary to the 
Viceroy that the Punjab disturbances were the direct result of Mountbatten's unwisdom in 
accelerating the date of partition. According to Cunningham if Punjab had been given time, 
the terrible massacre of August, September and October could have been avoided (The 
Sunday Times, 24 July 1994). 
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farming population the Muslims outnumbered the Sikhs by four to one. 
Nevertheless the Sikh claims were received very sympathetically and to invoke 
strong sympathetic impulses phrases like 'poor Sikh', 'what can we do or them' 
were frequently employed by very senior British officials (Ibid.: 212). Not only 
were the claims of the Sikhs grossly exaggerated but the attitude of the British 
(right from Mountbatten to British officials in Punjab) provided the necessary 
sustenance to Sikhs' unreasonable demands. In fact, most British officials made no 
secret of their sympathetic 'gestures' for the Sikhs. Mountbatten went to the extent 
of suggesting to Radcliffe that 'any generosity to Pakistan should be given more in 
Bengal than Punjab since there was no Sikh problem in Bengal' (Roberts 1994: 99). 
Similarly Jenkin was not only convinced of Sikh claims in Punjab but strongly 
supported their claims in his communications to the Viceroy (Ali 1967: 211-12). 
Indeed it seems that some form of gerrymandering took place in case of Ferozpur 
in order to adhere to Mountbatten's request of balancing generosity for Sikhs in 
Punjab and for Pakistanis in Bengal. Apart from Mountbatten's known hostilities 
towards Jinnah and Pakistan considerations to compensate the Sikhs must have 
played a significant role in having the award altered and securing Ferozpur and 
Zira for India. 
 
f )  M O U N T B A T T E N  
 
Finally the most important aspect of 'other factors' was the personal attitude and the 
role of the last Viceroy Mountbatten towards the whole partition processes. To 
analyse Mountbatten's attitude properly one needs to study it in three categories, 
attitude toward Jinnah and Pakistan, attitude towards Nehru and India, and attitude 
towards the preservation of perceived British interests. An impartial scrutiny of the 
Boundary Award clearly reflects Mountbatten's role as less than honourable. Being 
a member of a Royal family, people in India expected him to be extremely fair and 
above board. But the subsequent events clearly indicate that Mountbatten 
developed some kind of bias against Jinnah and Pakistan and consequently his 
policies resulted in damaging the interests of Pakistan rather badly. Various 
accounts forcefully emphasise that once it was decided by the Muslim League not 
to accept Mountbatten as the first Governor General of Pakistan, Mountbatten's 
attitude towards Pakistan became somewhat hostile and he seemed to have gone 
out of the way to damage Pakistani interests.13 This refusal not only wounded 
Mountbatten's pride but he thought that the refusal was engineered by Jinnah 
himself. Jinnah, on the other hand, claimed that the decision was taken somewhat 
against his will and on the insistence of his friends and colleagues (for details see 
Mujahid 1982: 116-51). Indeed not only Mountbatten was angered but his personal 
staff was also very bitter. Cynical remarks like 'Jinnah verdict goes in favour of 
Jinnah' were frequently echoing in the corridors of Viceroy's office following 
League's decision in favour of making Jinnah as its first Governor General (Ibid.). 
                                                 
13 Mr. A.T. Chaudhry quotes Viceroy's Personal Report No.11 and describes that the 
League's refusal to accept Mountbatten as the first Governor General of Pakistan was 
viewed as a bombshell (Chaudhry 1982: 83-99). 
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 With injured pride and badly hurt vanity, Mountbatten then seemed to have 
embarked upon a course of action which would damage Pakistan's interests and 
favoured India in almost all areas and issues. While the list of issues in which 
Mountbatten openly supported the Indian interests is very long, the issues that were 
directly linked with the division of Punjab involved the cases of Gurdaspur, 
Ferozpur, access to Kashmir, and the distribution of military assets to the two 
successor nations. The award of Gurdaspur and Batala to India provided the much 
needed link between India and Kashmir despite the fact that Gurdaspur was 
physically located next to Sialkot, a contiguous Muslim majority area enjoying 
physical proximity with an area that was to form part of Pakistan. Besides it was a 
dual purpose move. It would provide the much desired Indian access to Kashmir 
and compensate the Sikhs in some ways. Depriving Pakistan of a district which by 
any logical yardstick, would have been allocated to Pakistan, was an added source 
of satisfaction. As far as the case of Ferozpur was concerned, ample evidence 
suggests that initially both Ferozpur and Zira were given to Pakistan but last 
minute switch was made through the concerted efforts of Mountbatten (Syed 1982: 
152-54). An account by the Chief Engineer (Irrigation) of Bikaner amply revealed 
that well planned efforts were made to influence Mountbatten who, in turn, then 
seemed to have prevailed upon Radcliffe to change the award.14 
 Compared to Jinnah and Pakistan, Mountbatten's attitude towards Nehru and 
India can be easily classified as friendly and cordial. He went out of the way to 
accommodate the wishes of Congress leaders like Nehru and preserve the interests 
of India. His clear and unrelenting bias in favour of Nehru and India was well 
known to many senior British officers who did not hide their feelings. Field 
Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck suggested quick departure of the British from India 
soon after the partition as he felt that 'Mountbatten was no longer impartial'.1515 
According to another senior British officer General Messervy who stressed that 
'Mountbatten could see nothing except through Hindu eyes' (The Sunday Times, 24 
July 1994). While there exists sufficient evidence to support Mountbatten's biased 
attitude, four episodes are mentioned here in order to merely illustrate this point. 
First, just before it was decided to hold referendum in North West Frontier 
Province (NWFP) the then Chief Minister of the Province who was heading a 
Congress Ministry made frantic efforts to have a third option of an independent 
Pakhtoon State be included in the proposed referendum but Mountbatten refused 
on the grounds that the original partition plan was changed, on the insistence of 
                                                 
14 Dr. Kanwar Sain was a Chief Engineer (Irrigation) of the Bikaner State in 1947 who 
revealed in his book Reminiscences of an Engineer that he was ordered by the Maharaja of 
Bikaner to go with State's Prime Minister Sardar Pannikar to see Mountbatten. During the 
meeting, the representatives of Bikaner conveyed to Mountbatten that if Ferozpur went to 
Pakistan, the Maharaja of Bikaner would be left with no option except to opt for Pakistan. 
At this point, according to Dr. Sain, the colour of Mountbatten's face changed. It is not too 
far fetched to assume that since the Maharaja of Bikaner Sadul Singh and Mountbatten had 
been friends for quite some time and Mountbatten, who was already annoyed with Jinnah 
and Muslim League, deemed fit in his own wisdom to appease the Maharaja, to reward 
Nehru and to punish Pakistan in one move (Roberts 1994: 100-1). 
15 see 'Why Mountbatten should have been impeached', The Sunday Times, 24 July1994. 
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Nehru in order to exclude the option of independence for any province.16 This 
clearly indicates that Mountbatten was continuously consulting Nehru when he was 
preparing the partition plan. The Congress also complained that the then Governor 
of NWFP Sir Olaf Caroe was sympathetic to the Muslim League. Not only 
Mountbatten quickly arranged to have sent the Governor on leave but also showed 
the list of fifteen army officers selected to conduct the referendum in the NWFP to 
the Congress Chief Minister of NWFP (Cheema 1990: 50-51). The second episode 
reflecting how much Mountbatten cared for the Congress leaders revolves around 
his Kashmir visit. Just before Mountbatten actually visited Kashmir, he asked 
Nehru to prepare comprehensive note on the existing situation in Kashmir 
ostensibly meant to facilitate him for his intended encounters with Kashmiri 
leaders. In this note Nehru seemed to have highlighted that the people of the State 
would approve Kashmir's accession to India because of their devotion to Abdullah 
and the popularity of National Conference on one hand and on the other it down 
played the popularity of the Muslim Conference stressing that it enjoyed little 
influence in the State (For detailed analysis see Lamb 1992: 108-17). During his 
trip to Kashmir Mountbatten made no efforts either to contact Chaudhri Ghulam 
Abbas, the leader of Muslim Conference or to arrange a dialogue with Mir Waiz 
Mohammad Yusuf Shah in order to assess the views of known Muslim leaders 
(Ibid.). This episode unequivocally points towards his preference for Congress 
leaders. The logical course of action should have been that Mountbatten should 
have acquired another brief from the Muslim leadership in order to be familiar with 
the alternative interpretation of the situation as well as the aspirations of the people 
involved. Indeed it is difficult to reject that Mountbatten unhesitatingly trusted 
Nehru. Besides Nehru seemed to have had cultivated relations with Edwina 
Mountbatten and this seemed to have paid enormous dividends to Congress 
(Roberts 1994: 88). Third episode reflecting Mountbatten's overt bias in favour of 
India and Congress leader focuses on the division of military assets. Field Marshal 
Auchinleck was entrusted with the task of judicious division of military assets. 
Sensing how Auchinleck's scrupulous honesty could frustrate Indian designs to 
deprive Pakistan of its legitimate share of military assets, the Congress leadership 
systematically initiated a vilification campaign accusing Auchinleck of being more 
supportive to Pakistan than India. Mountbatten, of course, bought the Congress 
version regarding Auchinleck's role in the division of assets and begun to 
pressurise him to resign (for details see Connell 1959: 920-22; Cheema 1990: 17-
21). While performing the difficult task of dividing military assets Auchinleck was 
relying for support rather heavily upon the Viceroy, senior officers of the Indian 
                                                 
16 Despite the fact that Nehru once admitted to Mountbatten quite candidly that NWFP 
could not possibly stand by itself, the Congress Committee of the NWFP along with the 
Red Shirts passed a resolution for the establishment of a Free Pathan State and asked the 
Central Committee to influence Mountbatten. The Congress leaders entrusted Nehru to 
impress upon Mountbatten to include the third option. Had Nehru not made his contribution 
towards the exclusion of a third option at the formulation stage of partition plan 
Mountbatten would have in all probability agreed to this request of the Congress as well. 
He changed the Governor and also gave a choice regarding the selection of officers to be 
assigned to conduct the referendum (Cheema 1990: 50-51). 
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army and the Indian political leaders and all of them let him down in one form or 
the other but the most disappointing source of support which totally disillusioned 
Auchinleck was the Viceroy himself who did not hesitate in exhibiting his overt 
support for India and the Congress leaders (Ibid.). Fourth episode revolves around 
the secret understanding between the Congress and Mountbatten regarding the 
future status of Calcutta. How the British had already decided to give Calcutta to 
India without even considering logical claims of the Muslim League clearly 
reflected the one sided approach Mountbatten adopted.  
 Finally the third aspect of Mountbatten's attitudes revolves around his 
obsession to retain India within the Commonwealth. Mountbatten was extremely 
keen to retain India within the Commonwealth after its independence but not 
necessarily Pakistan (Roberts 1990: 88). He felt that the prestige of the Attlee 
government was inextricably linked with the retention of India within 
Commonwealth. Persuading India to join the Commonwealth consumed more of 
Mountbatten's time and energy than did the security questions (Ibid.: 91). Indeed 
'the threat not to join the Commonwealth gave the Congress leaders a lever over 
Mountbatten which they used to the full' (Ibid.). Krishna Menon's letter 
communicating to Mountbatten of dire consequences for the future of Anglo-Indian 
relations if Kashmir was allowed to join Pakistan is just one example of how the 
Congress leaders exploited Mountbatten's  weaknesses and inclinations (Lamb 
1992: 108).  
 Linked with the issue of retaining India within the Commonwealth, 
Mountbatten appeared to be somewhat concerned for the welfare of British 
officers. Instead of opting for strengthening of British India militarily he resisted 
all such attempts and worked on the policies to accelerate the departure of the 
British forces from India. Indeed such a policy eventually resulted in the massive 
massacres in Punjab. He appeared to be more concerned for the welfare of few 
thousands British soldiers and was not much bothered about the looming danger of 
massive communal horror that would keep the subcontinent in turbulence for years 
to come. In many ways Mountbatten's attitude towards partition processes reflected 
short sightedness and self orientation. Even the date of 14th August was selected 
merely because it was the second anniversary of Japanese surrender despite the fact 
it coincided with Muslim religious festivals. His hostile attitude towards Pakistan 
and Muslim League leaders was also the product of a personal rebuff.  
 The appointment of Sir Cyril Radcliffe generated the impression that the 
boundary award would be judicial and fair but the actual award disappointed many 
who viewed the award as more political than judicial. Not only the award was full 
of ambiguities, but it also gave birth to many complex problems that had and still 
continue to take a rather heavy toll of South Asian peace. While the disputes 
arising out of border territories were relatively less on the Western side than those 
on the East Pakistan's border, but the intensity of tension had been much higher 
primarily because of the water and Kashmir disputes. In addition, both the 
partitioned sections of Punjab experienced massive migration of people resulting 
into chaotic conditions in the border area. Even the Punjab Boundary force failed to 
stop lawlessness and disorder in the border areas. However when the dust settled 
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down following the colossal exchange of population, the Punjab waters dispute 
became the focus of attention. Simultaneously the ongoing Kashmir dispute 
continued to make things difficult and complicated. Thrice this border has 
experienced short but violent wars between the two countries. In addition, this 
border has been witnessing frequent troops concentration whenever things did not 
work out or the incumbent crisis deteriorated.  
 Apart from major wars, this border has also experienced innumerable violent 
border clashes. Part of the reason for these clashes was the dubious nature of 
Radcliffe Award which was not very clear and ignored various physical features. 
At some places of this border the two rivers Ravi and Sutlej formed the border but 
the boundary crossed the rivers at some places. Consequently some villages 
belonging to Pakistan were physically located on the Indian side of the river and 
vice-versa which though small in territory and area, often proved to be irritants in 
many situations.  
 
C O N C L U D I N G  R E M A R K S  
 
While most of the border disputes were finally resolved in border agreements, the 
politics governing the boundary award needs to be accompanied by clear answers 
to some probing questions. Why were the agreed principles violated? Was the 
award changed and if yes who changed it? When did the change take place? The 
revelation of source material in the 90s clearly highlights glaring defects of the 
partition plan of June 3rd, absurdity of limited time allocated to Radcliffe for the 
division of Punjab and Bengal Boundaries, and Mountbatten's interference in 
securing the desired changes in the Radcliffe award. Despite Mountbatten's 
expressed orders to his staff not to have any contact with Radcliffe's office and 
staff, it is now proved beyond any doubt that he and his staff like Lord Ismay had 
meetings with Radcliffe. 'According to Noel-Baker's report to the Prime Minister, 
Radcliffe had admitted that he showed the first draft of the proposed award to the 
authorities in Delhi and that, on further consideration, he made the award in terms 
which departed from the first draft'.17 In addition, Congress hierarchy made 
concerted efforts to have the award changed in accordance with its own priorities 
with and without Mountbatten's convenience . Mr.V.P. Menon's unsuccessful 
attempt to see Radcliffe's at midnight of August 11, 1947, Krisna Menon's threat to 
Mountbatten and Nehru's friendships with the Mountbattens all point towards two 
major conclusions. First, the award was changed at the last moment and in 
consequence Ferozpur and Zira which were initially allocated to Pakistan, were 
given to India at the last moment. In addition, it is also now known quite clearly 
how the Indian Congress leaders manipulated Mountbatten along with other British 
officers in order to secure land access to Kashmir (Lamb 1992: 114-15). Indeed the 
award of Ferozpur, Zira, Gurdaspur, and Batala could be viewed as an integral 
                                                 
17 The British Prime Minister asked the Secretary of State for Commonwealth relations to 
look into the allegations (linked with the changes of the award) raised by Pakistan Foreign 
Minister Zafrullah Khan who denounced the alterations in the Security Council (Roberts 
1994: 97). 
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component of Mountbatten's parting kick to Pakistan.  
To provide an answer to the second question is not all that easy as it involves 
the exactitude of timings. However one can systematically mention various 
indicators with dates which can certainly help in narrowing down the time frame. 
Indeed the issue of change or alterations mainly concerns Ferozpur and Zira area. It 
was this area which was initially, given to Pakistan but when the official award was 
announced, both these tehsils were shown as part of India. Radcliffe, himself 
termed this areas as an obvious case, obvious to go to Pakistan. George Abell's 
map which included this area on Pakistani side arrived at Government house in 
Lahore on 8th August. Few days afterward Abell's telegram was also received by 
the Governor of Punjab which simply stated 'eliminate salient' (Roberts 1994: 93-
94). This implies that changes took place between 9th and 13th August 1947. On 
9th August Chaudhri Muhammad Ali visited the Viceroy's house where he found 
Lord Ismay closeted with Sir Cyril Radcliffe. Chaudhri Muhammad Ali also saw a 
pencil drawn like across the map of Punjab which indicated both Ferozpur and Zira 
on Pakistani side. Dr. Kanwar Sain along with Sardar Pannikar met Mountbatten 
on 11th August in which the threat of Bikaner to join Pakistan was also employed. 
On the same evening V.P. Menon visited Radcliffe's bungalow though he was 
unable to see him but he met Beaumont. Next morning Radcliffe was invited to a 
lunch by Ismay with expressed instructions not to bring Beaumont on the pretext 
that 'there wound not be enough room at the table for the extra guest' (Ibid.: 96). 
According to Beaumont that was the first time he and Radcliffe were separated at 
any sort of function. 'That same evening Punjab line was changed with Ferozpur 
and Zira going to India' (Ibid.).  
With the new evidence now available for public scrutiny, it is quite clear that 
the award was altered as far as Ferozpur and Zira were concerned. Difference of 
opinion still exist over whether Mountbatten himself changed it or whether he 
exerted concerted pressures upon Radcliffe and secured the desired alterations. 
Ample evidence exists to prove that Mountbatten merely maintained the facade of 
having given strict orders to his staff not to make any contact with Radcliffe's 
office. Frequent but cautious meetings have taken place between Mountbatten's 
staff and Radcliffe. Noel Baker even went to the extent of mentioning in his report 
that Radcliffe had admitted having shown the first draft of the proposed award to 
the authorities in Delhi and that on further considerations, he made the award in 
terms which departed from the first draft.  
The Radcliffe Award was indeed unjust and more political than judicial. The 
Award of two contiguous Muslim majority tehsils of Gurdaspur district to India not 
only deprived the Pakistanis the legitimate Muslim majority areas but it also 
provided the valuable road and rail link from India to Kashmir. This link enabled 
the Maharaja of Kashmir to actively consider the India option as well. The last 
minute switched allocation of Ferozpur and Zira to India not only caused loss of 
large tracts of Muslim majority territory to Pakistan but also enabled Bikaner to 
safely join India. Had that been no last minute changes, the large arsenal of 
Bikaner, in all probability, would have come to Pakistan. The architect of all these 
secret changes appears to be indeed Mountbatten. With Beaumont revelation it is 
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rather difficult to absolve Radcliffe either. In the end one has to ask the question that 
why Christopher Beaumont had to wait little over 44 years to unveil this act of stark 
injustice. But then the history of British colonies is full of even more overwhelming 
and unjust decisions violating all accepted principles of fairness and justice. 
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